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The voice of the Church and other faith groups has become a significant contribution in the civic lives of our cities and the development of urban policy over the past 25 years. National government, regional development agencies, local authorities and neighbourhood renewal programmes all regularly engage with religious bodies as part of the planning and delivery of regeneration and services in urban communities. Of all the faith groups, it is the Church of England, through the ubiquity of its presence and experience, that has accompanied communities, previously designated as Urban Priority Areas, experiencing economic and physical regeneration, often from within broad-based partnerships which have brought about significant change (Graham and Lowe, 2009; Davey, 2000) .
Beyond the revitalised city centres and metropolitan hum, the Church has also been present within those communities which even government ministers have been willing to describe as 'disconnected', where Traditional, often semi-skilled, industrial jobs have continued to decline, with newly created higher paid jobs are open only to those with higher skill levels. In predominantly white areas, recent migration is sometimes perceived as changing communities in unpredictable ways…. creating new communities have often seemed ill-equipped to tackle the global nature of the regeneration industry. Major inward investment has often come from interests with little regard for local impact, remodelling space and markets on a globalised template.
The fault is not entirely with the private sector. Often for the voluntary and faith sectors, regeneration activity has become a scramble for influence and status, or contracts and grants, with attendant risks of collusion in the name of partnership. At times this has meant that the Church and other faith groups have missed or not understood significant shifts in policy, such as the marginalisation of community-led neighbourhood renewal within what is now the Department for Communities and Local Government, and what Allan Cochrane (2007) identifies as the disappearance of a distinct urban policy focus from the political agenda. Justin Beaumont's analysis of the re-emergence of faith-based organisations in the wake of neo-liberal retrenchment of the social democratic welfare state just as government is looking for partners from the community and voluntary sector to step into the breach, neatly captures a further dimension of this greater prominence of faith-communities as political actors, not least some of the more contradictory and frustrating aspects. Certainly, as Beaumont argues, 'we need to conceptualise changing dynamics between religion, politics and postsecular society ' (2008: 2019) , but the realignments of capital, civil society and the nation-state as players in the regeneration game represent ambivalent opportunities for grass-roots activism. On the one hand, they offer new spaces for innovative forms of engagement, as with the enhanced public profile of faithbased organisations in policy matters. On the other, however, they engender alienation amongst those who find themselves receiving little benefit from urban regeneration strategies that regard cultural industries or prestigious property development as prime drivers of economic revival (see Graham and Lowe, 2009: 99-114, Harvey, 2008) .
Theologians and faith-practitioners are only beginning to understand the consequences of asking 'Who is the city for?' as part of the 'What makes a good city?' debate. Yet questions of power, participation and the nature of citizenship are still crucial to any future patterns of regeneration, and the current disenchantment with local and national politics has a detrimental effect on the lives of our towns and cities. People are turning their backs on community and civic engagement as they see few prospects with the progress of the recession for the renewal of resources and infrastructure that might make a difference; or worse they are turning to those who offer the alternative scenario of a nation that resists the changes brought on by globalisation and immigration. This finds an outlet in the increasing hostility towards cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism perceived as a conspiracy against the white working class by the metropolitan (regenerated) elite.
Disorder, diversity and division
There has always been a strong theme within urban policy that urban places are disorderly, evidenced by riots and uprisings, as well as street-level crime attributable to the presence of minority ethnic communities (Cochrane 2007: 71) . While much early urban policy under New Labour shifted the emphasis of urban renewal to economic regeneration and the built environment within the rhetoric of social exclusion, there was a persistent fear of, in the words of Tony Blair, an 'underclass of people cut off from society's mainstream without any sense of shared purpose ' (Blair, quoted in Lister, 2004: 108) . The central efforts of the New Labour's Social Exclusion Unit seemed aimed at the usual focuses of urban intervention and the Unit was launched in 1997 by a prime ministerial visits to the multi-ethnic Aylesbury Estate in South London.
In parallel with this, much of the regeneration activity focused on the built environment has concentrated on a new metropolitan elite who demand 'defended spaces' within the urban core, gated and monitored by CCTV. While urban writers since Engels have celebrated the city as an encounter of strangers, urban restructuring has meant that those encounters with difference have become increasingly limited for those who can afford to 'opt out' from mixed neighbourhoods, community schools and other local interactions (Minton, 2009 ).
An increasingly negative perception of ethnically diverse localities is part of this trend, along with the perceived threats to culture, faith and employment by mass immigration and the association of migrants with crime, disease and disorder.
After Multiculturalism
Tariq Modood has defined multiculturalism as 'the recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, democratic discourses and the terms of citizenship and national identity' (Modood, 2007: 2) . Britain is a multicultural society, therefore, but the adoption of policies of multiculturalism implies a 'normative response' (Parekh, 2006: 6) to the facts of ethnic and cultural difference. Diversity is upheld and celebrated, but in a way which adopts a highly pragmatic and non-prescriptive approach towards the implications of difference (Dinham, Furbey and Lowndes, 2009: 84-86) .
Over the past twenty years, however, significant change has taken place within the interaction of immigrant communities in Britain as the post-immigration discourse of multiculturalism and 'political blackness' began to crack when faith entered the arena. For Tariq Modood, this was no better symbolised than in the battle over The Satanic Verses in the mid-1980s, when many Muslims were radicalised and organised discovering a new community identity based on religion rather than colour. This shift had significant impact on multicultural discourse where religion was generally perceived as culturally interesting but waning in terms of political significance. Yet the emergence of Islam as a publicly-articulated mark of identity was perceived as a threat by a secularised media establishment alongside the increasingly Islamophobic right. What is noteworthy in terms of our concerns here is the significance that Modood attributes to the space created by cross-religious dialogue during the Rushdie affair.
… what was even more striking was that when the public rage against Muslims was at its most intense, Muslims neither sought nor were offered any special solidarity by any nonwhite minority. It was in fact, a group of white liberal Anglicans who tried to moderate hostility against angry Muslims, and it was in interfaith forum a rather than in political-black organizations that space was created for Muslims to state their case without being vilified. (Modood, 2002: pp) It is not only the liberal elite or conservative media that struggled with the new, post-secular public space, however. Whilst much of the focus in community relations was concerned with 'multiculturalism' and the presence of Black and League (see Kundnani, 2009 ). There is also wide misgiving amongst faith communities themselves, especially within Islam, of the way in which faith-based organisations are being instrumentalised, almost as vehicles of social control, and that the predominant paradigm of faith and its public impact on the part of government is that of 'delivering' particular social outcomes. The bizarre reverse side is that Christian leaders find themselves having to explain to Muslims that they have no contact with or control over the BNP despite its claims of Christian identity.
More benignly, perhaps, is also the potential of faith groups to participate in programmes of social, cultural and economic renewal, and even, on the margins proved wanting in terms of white 'buy-in' which furnishes them with the means to construct an identity or self-understanding to match, and negotiate with, that of others. Stuart Hall is convinced, however, that while negotiation is critical over conflicts of 'outlook, belief and interest' they must not assume 'Eurocentric assimilation' as the starting or end point:
The specific and particular "difference" of a group or community cannot be asserted absolutely , without regard to the wider context provided by all those "others" in relation to whom "particularity" acquires a relative value. (Hall, 2000: 234) Assumptions are made about cultural homogeneity by those contesting a community, as well as by the media and commentators. It is apparent that white, African-Caribbean and Asian communities all contain elements of difference and hybrity that require internal negotiation, as well as challenges being made to an older leadership concerned with influence and stability, often through violence or indifference (Amin, 2002) .
To what extent are Right-wing extremist groups exploiting that vacuum in white communities? The re-emergence of faith in terms of identity, rather than practice, gives rise to many tiny 'clashes of civilisations' which offer little space for greater and smaller narratives of interaction and negotiation between and within communities. There is certainly evidence to suggest that Right-wing extremist groups and movements are shifting their rhetoric increasingly towards What is intriguing is the attempt by many of these groups to hijack a 'Christian' identity around which they hope to rally indigenous White support that perceives itself as having been disenfranchised by the ideology of multiculturalism. So for example, the English Defence League reproduces images of Crusaders in its publicity, with a poem that includes the lines:
The crusaders were once strong, now all but gone David Harvey argues that, 'The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is…one of the most precious yet neglected of our human rights' (Harvey 2008) . Ash Amin has written of the need to fashion a 'politics of wellbeing and emancipation out of multiplicity and difference and from the particularities of the urban experience' (Amin 2006) . It is a critical question for urbanists how a wider spectrum of interests can play a crucial part in reimagining the city and staking a claim to common urban future. It is vital that the discourse and activities of urbanists are not another reason for the alienation of the urban dispossessed. Patsy Healey's often quoted phrase about the common quest about 'how to manage our co-existence in shared space' is a starting point (Healey, 1997:3) . That shared space might be the neighbourhood, the municipality or the society. Finding commonality will move us to the edge of the concerns of funding and policy.
In increasingly fragmented, disoriented and anxious society can regain some mechanism for the distribution of hopefulness… (Amin, 2006) In what ways might the Church's action and theological interventions be expanding the habits of solidarity? Three case studies follow, which illustrate possible ways in which the Church within its community context has begun to articulate constructive forms of engagement with the political situation. We cannot pretend that by themselves they constitute decisive arguments in favour of maintaining the status quo, but maybe they start to indicate some of the principles for both Church and society on which any civic role of religion might rest. Urbanists often invoke the contested nature of urban space as a source of the city's dialectical creativity (see Merrifield, 2002) . These points of friction will need to be acknowledged and negotiated innovatively, rather than ignored or accommodated, if the urban is to be diverted from the dysfunctional and dystopian realities we have been describing. The Church's engagement with the public realm of post-secular cities in the twenty-first century will need to shed its political naivety and class predisposition if it is to be alongside the struggles for
